Five Strategic Objectives Behind Trump’s War with Iran

Washington D.C. Alfred Jyung Hyun Kim

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a full-scale airstrike campaign against Iran. President Trump, issuing the order directly from Air Force One, authorized “Operation Epic Fury,” which targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities, military bases, and key sites in Tehran where top leadership had gathered. The strikes resulted in the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (age 86) and the elimination of numerous senior Revolutionary Guard commanders. Iran immediately declared a 40-day period of national mourning, while the international community described the operation as a “surgical regime change.”

The Trump administration framed the strikes as “defending the American people and eliminating Iran’s nuclear and missile threats.” Behind the scenes, however, lay a far more ambitious geopolitical calculation.

1. Eliminating anti-Israel and anti-American leadership and cultivating “negotiable” successors

The core of the joint U.S.-Israeli “Operation Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion” campaign (February 28 to late March 2026) was a decapitation strategy. Building on the scenario Mossad Director David Barnea had presented to Netanyahu and Trump in January—exploiting public discontent to spark rebellion—the CIA’s human intelligence (HUMINT) network and Mossad’s AI-powered real-time targeting platform were combined to track and eliminate 49 senior Iranian leaders. The goal was to collapse the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command structure and force negotiations, all without committing ground troops. The approach relied on precision air and drone strikes.

Mossad had expanded its HUMINT network since late 2025, recruiting from protest families and disaffected IRGC elements. From January 2026, it used an Israeli-developed AI targeting system to monitor leaders’ movements, safe houses, and communications 24/7. The CIA cross-checked satellite and drone imagery with leaked hospital records and social-media data obtained after internet blackouts. Key targets included Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (struck February 28), Ali Larijani (National Security Council secretary, March 17), Gholamreza Soleimani (Basij commander, March 17), Mohammad Pakpour (IRGC commander-in-chief), Esmail Khatib (intelligence minister, March 18), and Alireza Tangsiri (IRGC Navy commander, late March).

On the first day of the campaign, U.S. B-2 stealth bombers and Israeli F-35I fighters struck Khamenei’s hideout outside Tehran with JDAMs and bunker-busters. On March 17, Mossad provided real-time coordinates for a combined drone (Hermes-2) and F-35 strike on Larijani and Soleimani in central Tehran. Khatib was hit at an intelligence center the next day, and Tangsiri’s naval command post was destroyed by cruise missiles. The 49 assassinations focused on “live targets,” exploiting the IRGC’s decentralized structure and achieving over 90 percent success without ground forces. Unmanned and stealth assets accounted for 70 percent of strikes, minimizing civilian casualties by design.

https://x.com/Osint613/status/2038522762180923631?s=20 

Trump’s objective was to use overwhelming military power to force Iran back to the negotiating table. By removing hardliners hostile to Israel and the United States, he aimed to install a “negotiable leadership” willing to cede control of the energy sector. In early March, Iran’s Foreign Ministry quietly opened back-channel talks through Europe, China, and Russia. By late March, Trump signaled that U.S. objectives had been met and that operations would end within two to three weeks. Whether the current Iranian leadership will prove to be a viable negotiating partner will become clear in that window. Their only realistic option is to abandon anti-Israel and anti-American policies and hand energy-sector dominance to the United States.

The method differed, but the underlying logic mirrored the Venezuela playbook: remove the Maduro-like figure and turn the remaining leadership into a Rodriguez-style negotiating partner. The goal was not total regime collapse but the creation of a leadership acceptable to Washington. By eliminating Khamenei—the chief architect of anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment—while preventing total anarchy that might hand Iran to China or Russia, the U.S. preserved leverage. As in Venezuela, where American companies secured resource access within three months, a similar energy-sector “deal” in Iran now looks plausible. The ideal U.S. outcome would be a stable pro-American government in Tehran, but the failure of the citizen uprising has made that unlikely.

2. Heightening tensions in the Strait of Hormuz: Realigning Middle East energy dominance around the U.S.-Israel axis

Iran had long weaponized the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil passes. Starting March 4, 2026, Iran declared a “de facto closure” of the strait and launched missile and drone attacks on vessels. As a result, commercial shipping traffic dropped more than 80%, and Brent crude prices surged to $98–$101 per barrel (IEA Oil Market Report, March 2026; Bloomberg, March 31, 2026).

Iran had long used the Strait of Hormuz — the world’s critical energy chokepoint — as a strategic weapon. In 2025, an average of 20–20.9 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait, accounting for about 20% of global oil consumption and 25–27% of seaborne crude trade (EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints 2025, IEA Oil Market Report 2025). Asian countries imported 84–89% of that volume, with China alone accounting for 37.7–50%. The main exporters were Saudi Arabia (37.2%), Iraq (22.8%), the UAE (12.9%), and Iran (10.6%).

After the February 28 “Operation Epic Fury” strikes, Iran’s declaration of a “de facto closure” dramatically changed the situation. Shipping traffic fell more than 80%, Brent crude hit $98–$101 per barrel, and global supply chains fell into chaos. The Trump administration’s plan was simple yet ambitious: permanently lower dependence on Hormuz and establish Israel as the region’s new Energy Hub. This aligned perfectly with the energy integration efforts under Abraham Accords 2.0 that had been underway since 2025.

1) Pre-positioning through Abraham Accords 2.0 (2025 preparation phase)

Immediately after taking office, the Trump administration named energy and security cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as “Abraham Accords 2.0” and spent all of 2025 advancing concrete infrastructure talks. Key elements included:

- Eilat–Ashkelon Pipeline (EAPC): Built in 1968, this existing pipeline had a northward capacity of about 1.2 million b/d. Originally designed to carry Iranian oil, it was repurposed in 2025 for reverse flow — moving Saudi and UAE crude from the Red Sea (Yanbu or Aqaba) through Eilat to Ashkelon on the Mediterranean. By the end of 2025, it already had an annual capacity of 60 million tons (approx. 1.2 million b/d).

- IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Corridor) energy axis: A land and pipeline project linking India, the Gulf, Jordan, Israel, and Europe. In December 2025, a $36 billion Israel-Egypt natural gas export deal (with Chevron’s participation) was approved, accelerating regional energy integration.

- Saudi East-West Pipeline (Petroline) linkage: Saudi Arabia’s existing 1,200 km pipeline (capacity up to 7 million b/d) connecting to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Informal talks on linking Yanbu–Eilat–Ashkelon began in 2025 and were viewed within the Abraham Accords 2.0 framework as “strategic insurance against Hormuz.”

These preparations worked immediately when the 2026 crisis hit. Right after the outbreak, Saudi Aramco maximized output on the East-West Pipeline, more than doubling loadings at Yanbu. European and Asian importers urgently began exploring Israeli overland and Mediterranean routes as alternatives to the Red Sea–Suez path.

2) Israel’s emergence as an energy hub during the Hormuz crisis: Netanyahu’s “Western Bypass” proposal

On March 19, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu proposed in a Newsmax interview a long-term solution: building energy pipelines that bypass Saudi Arabia westward from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. He emphasized that this would “permanently remove Iran’s geographic chokepoints at Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.”

Key ideas included:

- Creating an Aqaba Oil & Gas Hub linked to a Mediterranean terminal near Gaza, enabling 700–800 thousand b/d from the Gulf to Aqaba, with total westward capacity reaching 1.5–1.6 million b/d — exceeding Europe’s annual import needs of about 1 million b/d.

- Maximizing existing infrastructure by connecting Saudi East-West (7 million b/d), UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, and Israel’s Eilat–Ashkelon into one continuous corridor. Political barriers to routing through Israel had already been eased under Abraham Accords 2.0.

Within one month of the crisis, concrete movements emerged. Saudi loadings at Yanbu hit record highs, and European countries began listing the Israeli overland route as their top contingency option. This fundamentally elevated Israel’s geopolitical status. Once known as a country without oil, Israel was now becoming a major crossroads for Middle East energy flows.

3) Trump’s “We will control Hormuz” declaration and consideration of occupying Kharg Island: Pressure + opportunity creation

On March 9, 2026, President Trump declared, “We will control Hormuz,” and publicly considered occupying Kharg Island, Iran’s largest oil export terminal. Kharg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports, with storage capacity of 30–34 million barrels and the ability to load ten supertankers simultaneously.

Trump repeatedly threatened: “If there is no deal, we will turn Kharg Island, all power plants, and oil fields into rubble.” This was not mere military pressure but a declaration to forcibly reshape energy flow routes. Striking or occupying Kharg would effectively paralyze Iran’s exports and force Gulf producers to choose Israeli and Red Sea routes. During the crisis, Saudi Arabia and the UAE expanded cooperation with Israel in exchange for U.S. political risk insurance (up to $20 billion via DFC) and American naval escorts.

3. Ending allied free-riding and restoring a U.S.-centered military order

The most blatant aspect of the Trump administration’s Hormuz strategy was its aggressive effort to end allied free-riding. On March 9, 2026, President Trump declared, “We will control Hormuz,” and openly pressured European and Asian allies to “send your own troops and ships to protect the strait.” This was not just a military request — it was the extension of Trump’s long-standing “Art of the Deal” philosophy into the realm of energy security. Although the U.S. 5th Fleet had already been shouldering 70–80% of Hormuz patrols from its base in Bahrain, Trump made it clear: “The era of America paying the bill alone is over.”

1) Direct pressure on NATO and Europe, with NATO withdrawal threats

In a March 16, 2026 Financial Times interview, Trump warned, “Countries that use Hormuz should naturally contribute to its security. If they don’t help, NATO’s future will be very bad.” On March 31, via Truth Social, and again on April 1 through Reuters, he stated that most NATO allies had already refused to participate in military operations and that he was “strongly considering” withdrawing from NATO. This continued his first-term pressure on allies to meet the 2% GDP defense spending target. The 2025 National Security Strategy had already raised the bar to 5% GDP (“Hague Commitment”), and the Hormuz crisis became a real-world test of that policy.

European reactions were largely passive or openly negative:

- German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius: “This is not our war. We will not participate militarily.” (Politico, March 18)

- Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini: “Sending warships to a war zone means we are entering the war.” (Reuters, March 16)

- France, Spain, and Greece emphasized “diplomatic solutions first” and refused to dispatch ships.

- The UK only said it was “under review” but made no concrete deployment.

As a result, no official NATO operation had been launched by the end of March 2026. Only limited maritime awareness discussions, similar to the 2020 EMASOH mission, took place — with no meaningful combat support.

2) UAE’s active cooperation: Leading the Hormuz Security Force

The UAE responded positively to the U.S. message. On March 17, Presidential Diplomatic Adviser Anwar Gargash officially declared that the UAE “can participate in a U.S.-led multinational effort.” According to Financial Times and Reuters reports on March 27, the UAE was:

- Leading the creation of the “Hormuz Security Force” and persuading over 30 countries to join.

- Reviewing direct military roles including mine-clearing, convoy operations, and logistics support.

- Lobbying for a UN Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force.

The UAE had already surged its own naval vessels to the area by late March and was leading support for IMO resolutions. This decision stemmed from the benefits of the Abraham Accords 2.0 and strengthened energy ties with Saudi Arabia. The UAE calculated that cooperating with the U.S. would bring clear political and economic rewards.

3) Economic penalty mechanism: Widening the gap between cooperators and non-cooperators

The core of Trump’s strategy was to economically punish allies that refused to share the military burden:

- Cooperating countries (UAE, Saudi Arabia, and some Asian allies) received U.S. DFC political risk insurance (up to $20 billion), priority U.S. naval escorts, and preferential contracts for American shale oil.

- Non-cooperating countries (mostly Europe) suffered from surging oil prices ($98–$101 per barrel), leading to inflation and weakened industrial competitiveness. Even though Europe’s direct dependence on Middle Eastern oil was only 10–15%, global price shocks caused diesel and aviation fuel prices to rise 30–40%, hitting manufacturing and transportation hard (IEA Oil Market Report, March 2026).

On March 31, Trump posted on Truth Social: “If Britain can’t find jet fuel, then buy American oil or go get it yourselves from Hormuz.” This sent a clear message: “Secure your own energy without America if you won’t help.”

4) South Korea’s “strategic ambiguity”

The South Korean government (Lee Jae-myung administration) responded quickly on the economic front but maintained a deliberately ambiguous military stance.

Economically, Korea released a record 22.46 million barrels of strategic petroleum reserves in early March, signed an emergency 18-million-barrel oil deal with the UAE (involving 3 UAE tankers and 6 Korean vessels), expanded imports from the U.S., Russia, and Brazil, imposed fuel price caps for the first time in 30 years, and created a 100-trillion-won market stabilization fund. It also joined multinational statements condemning Iran’s de facto blockade and requested safety guarantees for Korean vessels.

Militarily, however, Seoul repeatedly gave vague responses. The government only said the Cheonghae Unit’s mission expansion was “under review.” Despite the 2020 precedent, it avoided firm commitments, citing the need for National Assembly approval and opposition from opposition parties and civic groups. The Ministry of National Defense repeatedly stated only that it was “in close consultation with the United States.” Experts pointed out that deploying Aegis destroyers would take 3–4 weeks and involve significant time, capability, and political costs.

In contrast to the UAE’s proactive stance, South Korea chose strategic ambiguity. Trump publicly criticized such behavior. Between March 14–16, he posted on Truth Social: “Countries affected — China, France, Japan, South Korea, UK — must send warships. We have helped Korea a lot. They should participate at least a little for their own energy security.” He added, “Europe needs to do more, but Korea, Japan, and China must also get involved. We will remember.”

A senior Trump administration official anonymously briefed that “Korea moved quickly economically (releasing reserves and signing the UAE deal), but its military contribution is insufficient. If Korea continues free-riding while America protects Hormuz, it will regret it later.” Meanwhile, countries like the UAE that cooperated actively received priority U.S. energy supplies and political risk insurance (up to $20 billion via DFC), strengthening reciprocal ties.

Trump used the Hormuz crisis to forcibly impose burden-sharing on energy security. Most NATO allies’ refusal reconfirmed the old “America will handle it” free-riding pattern, but it also allowed the U.S. to identify and reward “transactional allies” like the UAE. This was the practical application of the “regional burden-sharing network” outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy. It reduced America’s military and economic burden while teaching allies the realistic lesson: “Invest in your own interests.”

A senior Trump administration official summarized it clearly: “Hormuz is not just a strait — it is the ultimate test of 21st-century alliances.”

Non-cooperating allies (especially Europe, heavily dependent on Chinese markets) suffered inflation and declining industrial competitiveness due to soaring oil prices. In contrast, cooperating nations gained advantageous positions through U.S. political risk insurance and naval protection. This was a direct extension of Trump’s “America First” energy dominance strategy. In 2025, the U.S. had once again become a net energy exporter. The Middle East chaos ultimately strengthened the price competitiveness of American shale oil. Within one month of the strait’s closure, the IEA was forced to release 400 million barrels from strategic reserves. Ultimately, the Hormuz crisis successfully neutralized Iran’s weaponization of energy and realigned Middle East energy flows around a U.S.-Israel axis. Free-riding allies are now paying the economic price.

4. Driving a wedge into the China-Russia-Iran axis

China, Russia, and Iran had built a joint front against the U.S.-led world order through their “unlimited strategic partnership” since the early 2020s. Until 2025, Iran supplied discounted crude oil in large volumes to China and transferred Shahed drone and missile technology to Russia, forming a mutually complementary military-energy network.

However, the U.S.-Israeli “Operation Epic Fury” on February 28, 2026, and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz exposed the structural weaknesses of this “axis.” The Trump administration’s divide-and-conquer strategy used diplomatic, economic, and military pressure to impose direct economic costs on China and strategic isolation on Russia, ultimately shattering trust within the alliance. Below is a detailed analysis based on 2025–2026 data from IEA, Vortexa, Kpler, Reuters, Al Jazeera, and UN Security Council documents.

China’s Losses: Heavy dependence on Hormuz (35–50%) → Direct energy and economic hit, but response limited to “peaceful resolution” diplomacy

In 2025, China’s daily crude oil imports hit a record average of 11.55 million barrels, with approximately 35% (44–51% on a seaborne basis) passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Middle Eastern oil accounted for 55% of total imports. After the February 28 strikes, Iran’s declaration of a “de facto closure” of the strait caused Brent crude prices to surge to $98–$101 per barrel and disrupted supplies of discounted Iranian crude. This led to a sharp drop in refining margins for China’s independent refineries (“teapot” refineries).

However, China’s pre-positioning was effective. With 1.39 billion barrels of strategic reserves (120 days of net imports), over 46 million barrels of Iranian crude in floating storage, record Russian imports of 1.92 million barrels per day, and alternative routes from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Beijing managed to cushion the short-term shock.

While immediate damage was contained, analysts warned that a prolonged crisis could reduce China’s GDP growth by 0.5–1 percentage point. Instead of military involvement, China limited its response to repeated calls for “peaceful resolution.” It scaled down and postponed the planned “Maritime Security Belt 2026” joint exercise. Meanwhile, Beijing expanded energy deals with Russia, but this backfired by giving Moscow greater pricing power. The Trump administration described the situation as “China becoming Russia’s energy slave.”

Russia’s Duality: Short-term gains from higher oil prices, but minimal support for Iran → Viewed as a “disposable ally”

Russia was the biggest beneficiary of the crisis. With oil prices rising 25% on average in March 2026, Russia — whose energy revenues had hit a five-year low in 2025 — expected a significant increase in oil and gas tax revenue (281.7 billion rubles). It enjoyed an unexpected windfall from the war.

However, Russia’s support for Iran remained extremely lukewarm. Focused on the Ukraine front, Moscow refrained from supplying additional drones or missiles and limited its involvement to symbolic participation in the February “Maritime Security Belt 2026” exercise. Instead, Russia focused on economic exploitation: signing a 55 billion cubic meters per year gas supply agreement, securing $4 billion worth of seven oil field development projects, and providing funding for nuclear power plants. Russian companies like Gazprom gained priority rights in Iran’s upstream projects, making Tehran increasingly dependent on Moscow.

Middle East media outlets such as Al Jazeera noted that “Moscow views Iran as a disposable ally.” While Putin publicly condemned the U.S. attack, Russia avoided any real military intervention or economic sacrifice.

Formal solidarity at the UNSC vs. zero substantive support → Collapse of trust within the axis

China and Russia repeatedly blocked the snapback of Iran sanctions (Resolution 2231) at the UN Security Council between September 2025 and March 2026, citing “legal and procedural flaws.” However, they provided absolutely no meaningful military or economic assistance. China refused military involvement and only pushed for diplomatic solutions. Russia, preoccupied with Ukraine, offered no additional weapons.

In response, senior Iranian Foreign Ministry and IRGC officials publicly expressed anger over the “betrayal by their allies.” In March 2026, leaked internal documents revealed that “China and Russia failed to deliver on their promised support.” This stood in sharp contrast to the “axis unity” they had displayed during joint exercises until late 2025. In the end, when the real crisis hit, each country prioritized its own interests.

On April 1, 2026, President Trump posted on Truth Social: “The China-Russia-Iran alliance is finished.”

5. The masterstroke: engineering a digital petrodollar reset

1) Strategic Opportunity for Dollar-Based Stablecoins Amid the Crisis

Dollar-backed stablecoins maintain stability through 1:1 reserves of U.S. dollars and enable low-cost international transfers of hundreds of thousands of transactions per second via blockchain technology. As of March 2026, USDT’s market capitalization exceeded $145 billion, while USDC surpassed $62 billion. During the crisis, stablecoin trading volume surged 180%, with a sharp increase in Middle Eastern and Asian companies using USDT to bypass Iran sanctions.

The Trump administration took notice. The Federal Reserve and Treasury Department had been quietly preparing a “Digital Dollar Framework” since 2025, defining stablecoins as “the digital extension of the U.S. dollar.” As the oil price and exchange rate shocks highlighted the slow speed and high costs of traditional banking systems, stablecoins emerged as a natural alternative. If the “currency reset” scenario materializes, a new standard could form in which over 60% of global trade is settled in dollar-based stablecoins.

2) Trump’s Attack on Iran: A Calculated Move to Secure Currency Dominance?

Immediately after the crisis erupted, the United States proposed a stablecoin payment infrastructure alongside an emergency 18-million-barrel oil deal with the UAE. The Trump administration implicitly offered allies “sanctions relief and priority energy supplies” in exchange for using dollar stablecoins. This represents the digital version of the 1970s petrodollar system. At a time when BRICS nations were actively pushing de-dollarization, the Hormuz crisis provided the perfect timing for a forced reset.

A successful digital currency reset would strengthen dollar liquidity in the short term and reduce international transaction costs by 30–40%. However, it would also intensify competition from BRICS CBDCs and gold-backed currencies, raising the risk of deeper global financial fragmentation. Stablecoin adoption is expected to rise 20–30%, but regulatory and privacy concerns may limit full U.S. dominance, and a multipolar currency system could accelerate in the long run.

BEXUS Policy Research Institute Recommendations to the Trump Administration:

1. If the Iranian leadership refuses to cooperate with the United States, completely destroy its energy infrastructure and oil refineries.

2. Maintain tension in the Strait of Hormuz without deploying U.S. ground troops.

3. Rapidly legislate a stablecoin regulatory framework to establish U.S.-issued coins as the global standard.

4. Build a joint “Digital Petrodollar” platform with allied nations.

5. In case of prolonged crisis, release additional strategic petroleum reserves while expanding incentives for stablecoin adoption.