Anti-America·Anti-Israel Korean Brothers Emerge as South Korea's Most Powerful Duo

From Radical Anti-U.S. Activist to Prime Minister

On May 23, 1985, Kim Min-seok, then president of the Seoul National University student council and chair of the National Student Federation, was among those who led the occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center in downtown Seoul. For three days, 73 students held the building, demanding that Washington acknowledge responsibility for the Gwangju incident and issue a formal apology. Kim coordinated inter-campus committees and handled planning and logistics. The sit-in ended in arrests. In 1986, he was convicted under the Assembly and Demonstration Act and the National Security Law, serving nearly three years before receiving a special pardon in 1988.

He later called the episode “a conscientious act of youth.” In a 1992 essay, he detailed the planning and the student solidarity behind the protest. However, at a foreign press briefing in 2025, he stated that he had not directly participated and had only delivered food and water, an apparent contradiction that stirred controversy.

Kim’s path soon shifted toward institutional politics. In October 2016, he appeared at an anti-THAAD candlelight rally in Gimcheon, again siding with anti-alliance demonstrators. After martial law was declared on December 3, 2024, amid the impeachment turmoil surrounding President Yoon Suk-yeol, Kim drove a hard-line campaign in the National Assembly, submitting two impeachment motions and helping to frame Yoon’s actions as “insurrection and constitutional subversion”, a process that culminated in the Constitutional Court’s removal of Yoon on April 4, 2025.

At his confirmation hearing in June 2025, Kim said, “I am not anti-American. I hold a U.S. law license; my actions were about uncovering the truth.” He also called the 1985 occupation “an awakening for both Korea and the United States.”

On July 3, 2025, he was sworn in as the Republic of Korea’s 49th prime minister. With a government reorganization transferring budget authority to the Prime Minister’s Office, the post is expected to wield unprecedented power. Yet the paradox remains: a man once jailed for occupying a U.S. building now heads a government anchored in the U.S.–Korea alliance.

Kim Min-seok’s Quiet Anti-US Sentiment to Washington

Prime Minister Kim Min-seok is facing criticism for what opponents call a “quiet anti-U.S. sentiment.” Remarks touching on trade, investment, and U.S. Forces Korea have prompted debate over whether Seoul is recalibrating its alliance posture. The controversy began in mid-September when, in an interview with Bloomberg, Kim said, “Without resolving visa issues and trade barriers, Korean investment in the U.S. cannot advance meaningfully.”

As the debate widened, anti-U.S. rallies calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops were held near bases in Daegu and Pyeongtaek. Protesters shouted, “Stop pressuring Korea,” and “Not one more penny to the U.S.” Some cited Kim’s “economic sovereignty” comments to argue that the government should stop “tiptoeing around Washington.” The demonstrations were organized by Candlelight Action and groups aligned with the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, and observers noted links to networks involving Kim’s elder brother, activist Kim Min-woong.

Kim avoided direct comment, but his silence was read by some as tacit approval, raising concern in diplomatic circles. “The Prime Minister’s messaging has shifted from ‘cooperation’ toward ‘checking’ U.S. demands,” one diplomatic source said—“a partial divergence from the presidential office’s emphasis on minimizing friction with Washington.” In early October, chairing an APEC preparatory meeting, Kim said, “Korea must stand for fairness in regional trade and face down protectionist behavior by major partners.” He did not name a country, but the remark was widely read as aimed at the United States, echoing progressive calls for “economic self-determination.”.

Xing Haiming’s Warning and Kim Min-seok’s Order to Punish Anti-China Rallies

Shortly after Chinese Ambassador Xing Haiming publicly warned against rising anti-China sentiment in Korea, it emerged that Prime Minister Kim Min-seok had ordered a crackdown on anti-China rallies, setting off a firestorm. The opposition blasted the move as “curtailing free expression to appease a foreign envoy,” while some within the ruling bloc called it “unduly submissive.”

The controversy began with Xing’s speech at an international forum at the Sejong Center on September 23, where he said “some in Korea are intentionally demonizing China,” warned this could “seriously damage bilateral ties,” and added that China would “not sit idly by” if anti-China rallies and disinformation persisted.

On September 25, at a National Tourism Strategy Meeting at KTO’s Seoul Center, Kim said:

“Hate speech and violent rallies targeting a specific culture, religion, or nation must be eradicated. Crack down with state power on radical protests containing anti-China messaging.”

Conservative media argued the statement opened the door to legal penalties and preemptive policing, raising free-speech concerns. Some outlets also reported internal discussions in City Hall about pre-approval measures for downtown anti-China demonstrations on public-order grounds.

“Why Stay Silent on Anti-American Protests?” Lawmaker Kim Min-jeon’s Public Reproach

During a National Assembly interpellation session on September 18, lawmaker Kim Min-jeon of the People Power Party confronted Prime Minister Kim Min-seok with sharp criticism.

“President Lee labeled the anti-China protests as ‘not freedom of expression, but chaos.’Then why is there no word from the government about the anti-American protests? There are rallies where protesters tear up photos of President Donald Trump and burn the American flag, yet the government remains silent.”

Rep. Kim argued that if South Korea values its alliance with the United States, the same standards should apply to anti-American demonstrations. She accused the administration of selectively restricting freedom of assembly and expression according to its diplomatic interests.

Prime Minister Kim avoided a direct response, saying only:

“Perhaps the President’s comments referred to the presence of hateful or excessively violent expressions.”

Rep. Kim retorted,

“That answer will not convince the public. Freedom of expression must be applied fairly.”

“‘Not Talbukja but Dobukja’—Terminology at the Center of the Storm”

A Weekly Chosun piece reported that Kim’s Tsinghua LL.M. thesis (65 pages, with 55 pages of main text, largely in English) used dobukja (“those who fled North Korea”) instead of the standard Korean and widely used Chinese term talbukja (defectors from the North). In the acknowledgments, the thesis also used bandoja (“those who betrayed and fled”), a phrase critics say frames North Korean escapees as political turncoats. Chinese legal practitioners cited in the report noted that even in China, dobukja is hardly used, with terms like “illegal border crossers” or toudoja (stowaways) being more common.

The thesis emphasized the roles of China and UNHCR as “key” to resolving the issue, seen by critics as aligning with Beijing’s refusal to recognize North Korean escapees as refugees. Formatting lapses added fuel: in the Chinese-language acknowledgments, Kim reportedly misspelled his advisor Prof. Li Zhaojie’s name (using 召 instead of 兆), and listed his wife and two children in English but omitted his son in Chinese, details that resurfaced amid “dad-vantage” allegations. Kim’s former aide said he assisted with research and logistics while Kim traveled to China for much of the process, though questions remain about attendance and academic fulfillment while he was active in domestic politics. An international-law scholar commented, “The choice of terms appears sensitive to Chinese policy framing. It reads not merely as scholarship, but as a message that can be construed as politically sympathetic to Beijing.”

Meeting with Woo Soo-geun and Outreach to Pro-CCP Groups

In January 2025, Kim held a one-on-one luncheon with Woo Soo-geun, head of the Korea–China Friendship Federation, an event disclosed by the group and spotlighted by the opposition as a potential starting point for “Democratic Party–pro-China entanglement.” Woo, known for urging attention to “Pax Sinica” and for predicting U.S. decline, has publicly argued that Korea should invest more in a China-centric alignment.

The Brother Behind the Protests

While the younger brother became a statesman, Kim Min-woong built his career as an intellectual and activist who never abandoned his anti-American critique. In 2003, amid the Iraq War, Kim declared in an interview that the crisis on the Korean Peninsula was “largely America’s responsibility,” and that U.S. wars abroad were designed to preserve hegemony. His writings, including the book Empire in the Chamber, portrayed the United States as a permanent “war state” bent on protecting its empire.

Kim’s rhetoric only intensified in recent years. In October 2023, as Hamas launched its assault on Israel, Kim wrote that the offensive had “plunged arrogant Israel into confusion,” a comment condemned by the Israeli embassy in Seoul. He later joined solidarity marches with pro-Palestinian groups, framing both Israel and the United States as aggressors.

By July 2025, his language had reached a peak of blunt hostility:

• He called Trump’s America “the final stage of Yankee imperialism.”

• He declared the U.S.–Korea alliance “a shackle around our necks.”

• He urged that “our generation must drive Yankee imperialism out of this land.”

• He demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, describing it as a task of national liberation.

  
  

Kim Min-woong’s leadership role in Candlelight Action, a major civic coalition, cemented his position as a protest kingmaker. As co-representative, he stood at the forefront of the Yoon Seok-yeol resignation movement, with the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) joining under his banner. Protest marches carried slogans not only against Yoon but also against U.S. military presence and Israel’s policies.

Critics describe him as the elder brother who articulates, without hesitation, the radical lines that his younger brother, as Prime Minister, cannot officially voice.

Power in Tandem

Analysts increasingly see the brothers as working in complementary roles:

Kim Min-seok manages statecraft, diplomacy, and institutional power. Below are the restructuring items that either place organizations directly under the Prime Minister’s Office or significantly strengthen its functions.

Sector / Organization	Direction of Restructuring	Involvement of PM’s Office	Notes / Status
Planning & Budget Office	Separation of budget functions from the Ministry of Strategy and Finance to create a new Planning & Budget Office	Newly established as a ministerial-level agency under the Prime Minister’s Office	Included in the government restructuring plan. Scheduled to take effect on Jan. 2, 2026.
Department of Finance & Economy	Reorganized from the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, now focused on economic policy (without budget functions)	Serves as an economic and fiscal policy body after shedding budget authority	Planned in the government restructuring proposal.
Financial Supervisory Organization	Some financial policy functions of the Financial Services Commission to be unified under the new Finance & Economy Department; supervisory functions to be split into an independent agency	Supervisory authority indirectly connected to the PM’s restructuring plan	Part of the government reorganization draft (“Financial Supervisory Commission” under discussion).
Prosecution Service	Abolishment/dismantling of the Prosecutor’s Office after 78 years; division of indictment and investigative powers into two separate agencies	Though not directly “under the PM’s Office,” it represents a key part of the overall restructuring	Confirmed in the government’s reorganization plan.
Strengthening of PM’s Office Authority	Expansion of authority to include budget allocation, statistics, and supervisory functions	The transfer of budgetary functions is viewed as a major boost in PM’s powers	Media reports describe the PM’s Office as becoming a “powerful central institution.”
Overall Government Restructuring / Downsizing	Mergers and adjustments among existing ministries and bureaus	The PM’s Office is expected to play a bigger role in coordination	Reported as part of the overall restructuring blueprint.

• Most of these are included in the government’s reorganization plan, but not all have passed the legislative process yet.

• The Prosecutor’s Office restructuring is highly controversial, requiring legal amendments and facing political resistance.

• The transfer of budget functions is widely interpreted as a significant centralization of power within the PM’s Office, with some reports predicting that it will become a new “power center” of government.

• Government officials have clarified that some internal economic assessment documents were not directly linked to the restructuring plan, countering certain media interpretations.

• Prime Minister Kim Min-seok himself has emphasized “organizational efficiency” but also noted that “social consensus must come first”, signaling a cautious approach.

  
  

“Kim Min-woong’s Accusations, Kim Min-seok’s Arrests”, The Spread of China-Style Political Control in South Korea

South Korea’s political landscape is undergoing a dangerous transformation. A new dual power structure has emerged one that strikingly resembles the Chinese Communist Party’s public security model. Under this system, political activists file accusations, and state authorities swiftly execute arrests. At the center of this mechanism stand two brothers: Kim Min-woong, the activist leading South Korea’s largest civic coalitions, and Kim Min-seok, the Prime Minister wielding extraordinary administrative power.

In recent months, organizations led by Kim Min-woong, most notably Candlelight Action and its affiliate networks, have filed a series of criminal complaints targeting political opponents, journalists, and civil activists. What is most alarming, however, is the speed and coordination with which the Prime Minister’s Office and subordinate agencies have acted after each complaint. These responses have bypassed normal judicial procedures, creating a new hybrid mechanism in which civil accusations and state enforcement merge into a single power structure.

A representative example is the White Skull Squad (Baekgoldan) case. The White Skull Squad was an organization that acted to prevent the illegal arrest of President Yoon Suk-yeol during his impeachment crisis. However, soon after Kim Min-woong publicly declared through the media that he would file a complaint against the group, both the White Skull Squad and I, as its organizer, were accused by allied activist networks of “forming a criminal organization” and “obstructing public officials in the execution of their duties.” At the time of the complaint, I was residing in the United States, and the case was later closed due to my absence. However, several senior members of the White Skull Squad remained under investigation, and some continue to face ongoing police inquiries to this day.

The arrest of Lee Jin-sook, Chair of the Korea Communications Commission, stands as another vivid example of this phenomenon. What began as a civic complaint evolved into a full-blown state-led prosecution, exposing the fusion between civil pressure and administrative coercion.

Kim Min-woong's civic organization 'Candlelight Action' filed a formal complaint against Lee earlier this year with the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO), claiming her statement in a National Assembly session, that “President Lee Jae-myung had directly ordered revisions to the Broadcasting Acts”, constituted defamation and the spread of false information. The group demanded both criminal punishment and immediate dismissal.

Soon after, prosecutors and police launched investigations with unprecedented speed. Insiders alleged that administrative pressure from the Prime Minister’s Office influenced the process, suggesting the case was a politically motivated operation rather than an impartial enforcement of law. Police cited Lee’s “failure to comply with six official summonses” as grounds for an arrest warrant, which the court approved with unusual haste.

However, columnist Choi Bo-sik, in his report “How Did Lee Jin-sook End Up in Handcuffs?”, questioned the legitimacy of the entire process. He noted inconsistencies in the six alleged summonses, some coinciding with Lee’s verified Assembly schedule, and argued that “the claim of noncompliance appears to have been fabricated to justify a predetermined arrest.”

Choi also highlighted the staged, coercive nature of the arrest. “Lee was handcuffed and paraded before cameras it was a political performance, not law enforcement,” he wrote. In his follow-up column, “The Political Madness Behind Lee Jin-sook’s Handcuffs,” Choi compared the incident to Japan’s prewar ‘thought police,’ warning that “when power and police merge under the guise of moral authority, freedom of expression collapses.”

The Lee Jin-sook case reveals a dangerous new model of governance, a replication of the Chinese-style public security system, where activist accusations trigger administrative enforcement. Candlelight Action acts as the prosecutor, the Prime Minister as the judge, and the police as the executioner.

This was not merely the arrest of a public official. It was the manifestation of a systemic transformation, signaling that South Korea is moving toward a controlled state where dissent is criminalized and expression is suppressed. Lee Jin-sook’s handcuffs have thus become a chilling symbol of the nation’s slide toward authoritarian governance under a Chinese-style control paradigm.

The Brothers’ Shadow over Korea: Anti-U.S. and Anti-Israel

The convergence of formal authority and street mobilization poses new challenges for Korean diplomacy. The U.S. alliance remains central to national security, yet a prime minister with an anti-American past, and a brother shouting “Yankee, go home” risks unsettling ties. Washington worries about trade talks, defense cooperation, and trilateral coordination with Japan; Israeli observers note the growth of anti-Israel rhetoric within protest networks linked to Kim Min-woong.

Whether orchestrated or parallel, the Kim brothers now stand at the center of power: one leads government; the other, the streets. Together, they represent a political force marrying institutions and populist protest, and may redirect Korea’s trajectory.

They operate as a complementary power structure:

• Kim Min-seok consolidates institutional power, accused by critics of nudging Korea toward a one-party model reminiscent of the Chinese Communist Party.

• Kim Min-woong drives radical street action, amplifying pro-China, anti-U.S., and anti-Israel narratives.

  
  

Candlelight Action, under Kim Min-woong, has worked with the KCTU to expand anti-U.S. frames from streets to media and education. In June 2022, the KCTU held an “Anti-American, Self-Reliant Workers’ Rally,” demanding revisions to SOFA, accountability for crimes by U.S. troops, and, ultimately, U.S. troop withdrawal. Joint campaigns with Candlelight Action have since carried anti-U.S. and anti-Israel messages.

This influence has shaped media and campuses over two decades. During the candlelight movements, boycotts and subscription cancellations targeted conservative newspapers, while on campuses, “candlelight girls” and student circles helped fuse education-policy debates with street protests.

The most consequential outcome was the impeachment of President Yoon. From his inauguration, impeachment campaigns began. The first motion on December 7, 2024 failed for lack of quorum; the second on December 14 passed, suspending him. On April 4, 2025, the Constitutional Court upheld the motion, removing him from office. Candlelight Action claimed their sustained pressure made it possible.

Kim Min-woong claims Hamas’s massacre of Israeli civilians as “armed resistance.”

 At 6:30 a.m. on October 7, 2023, Hamas launched “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,” firing more than 2,500 rockets at southern Israel and breaching the border by paraglider, land, and sea. At the Supernova music festival in the Re’im desert, gunmen slaughtered hundreds of young people; children, the elderly, and women were burned in their homes; entire families were abducted. In a single day, over 1,200 people were killed and more than 200 taken hostage.

As the world condemned the atrocities as terrorism, Kim Min-woong took the opposite line. Two days later, he wrote, “Hamas’s offensive has thrown arrogant Israel into confusion,” and argued that “armed action by Palestinians is an armed counterattack against reality,” drawing protests from the Israeli embassy and censure in the press. He also led pro-Palestinian rallies as a co-leader of Candlelight Action, chanting “Free Palestine” from the stage at Cheonggye Plaza and fusing anti-U.S./anti-Israel slogans. He linked Korea’s security architecture with Gaza, calling the Korea-U.S.-Japan “war alliance” an offensive line against the North. Through columns, lectures, and YouTube panels, he consistently reframed Israel as an “aggressor state” and Palestinians as an “oppressed people,” spreading this line especially among youth and civil society.

He accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s far-right government of pursuing an “ethnic cleansing policy” against Palestinians and claimed that Hamas’s actions were a response to Israel’s “extreme militarism and colonial domination.” “There can be no peace without resolving the reality of an occupied nation,” Kim Min-woong wrote.

Kim Min-woong went further, drawing a direct political parallel between the Middle East and South Korea:

“Israel has Netanyahu, the far-right; we have Yoon Suk-yeol — and we must bring him down.” He argued that South Korea’s alliance with the United States mirrors Israel’s dominance over Palestine and called for Seoul to pursue a “Two States” approach similar to the divided Korean peninsula.

Kim Min-Woong also criticized the South Korean press, claiming that domestic media “parrot the perspectives of Israel and the U.S.” He condemned their portrayal of Hamas as a terrorist group, insisting that such views “ignore the historical legitimacy of anti-colonial liberation struggles.” He dismissed reports linking Hamas and North Korea as “absurd and baseless conspiracies.”

In essence, Kim Min-woong’s remarks distorted Hamas’s massacre of Israeli civilians into an act of “armed resistance,” while equating Israel’s far-right leadership with South Korea’s conservative government, urging the ouster of President Yoon Suk-yeol.

Kim Min-woong’s Anti-Israel, Pro-Palestinian Timeline

① Column | “Ah, Palestine!”

• Date: 2000-10-18

• Outlet: News & Joy

• Focus: Framed the Palestinian refugee crisis as an issue of justice and solidarity through biblical references; urged Korean churches to embrace universal human rights.

  
  

② Recommendation/Contribution | Book list on Palestine

• Date: 2004-07-19

• Outlet: PPSK (Palestine Peace Solidarity Korea) website

• Focus: Curated works on occupation and massacres, urging Korean readers to confront realities.

  
  

③ Book (context) | Empire in the Chamber

• Date: 2003 (intro/coverage)

• Outlet: Tongil News

• Focus: Dissects “the war-state apparatus of U.S. empire”, an intellectual foundation for later anti-Israel/pro-Palestine arguments.

  
  

④ Lectures/Essays (related) | Critiques of the “War on Terror”

• Date: 2016-02

• Outlet: People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) materials

• Focus: Argued the “War on Terror” undermines human rights and peace; situates Palestine within anti-imperialist security discourse.

  
  

Kim engaged these themes since the early 2000s; explicit anti-Israel/pro-Palestine advocacy surged after 2023.

⑤ Column | “Palestine Questions Humanity’s Conscience”

• Date: 2023-10-22

• Outlet: Mindle News

• Focus: After the Gaza war flared, labeled Israel/U.S. as bearing “war-crime” responsibility; used terms like “massacre” and “ethnic cleansing”; urged solidarity with Palestine.

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⑥ SNS / Rally Quotes | Hamas attack controversy

• Date: 2023-10-09~11

• Where: Facebook posts cited by media; rallies near the Seoul Finance Center/Cheonggye Plaza

• Focus: Wrote that “Hamas’s offensive plunged arrogant Israel into confusion,” and called the armed strike a “counterattack against reality,” triggering accusations of justifying armed struggle.

  
  

⑦ Forum/Lecture | “Emergency Action: Korean Civil Society in Solidarity with Palestine”

• Date: 2024-12-01

• Where: Gangbuk Workers’ Welfare Center (reported)

• Focus: Critiqued Western framing of Gaza coverage, calling media “accomplices to massacre”; broadened civil-society agenda.

  
  

⑧ Op-eds/Commentary (KR/EN)

• Date: 2024–2025

• Outlets: Domestic and foreign media (e.g., Hankyoreh English editorials in tandem with the progressive line)

• Focus: Cast Gaza blockade, separation regime, and settlements as structural violence; urged ceasefire and recognition of Palestinian statehood.

  
  

⑨ Overseas Event (Notice) | New York diaspora forum

• Date: Reported 2025-07-31 (held 8/2)

• Outlet: NewsM (New York)

• Focus: Linked “post-candlelight” Korean democracy with external agendas including Gaza; channel for exporting the narrative overseas.